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Abstract. Research in suicidology has focused on the analysis of interindividual differences and 
has neglected the subjective and intersubjective dimensions of human experience. Suicidal 
behaviour must be understood in the complex convergence between personal, interpersonal, 
social and cultural elements. Every human action (e.g., suicidal behaviour) should be placed and 
conceived in continuity with the sociocultural world. Both societal discourses and personal 
meanings are constitutive elements of such experience. The representational systems shared by 
communities or groups are multiple resulting in diverse representations of suicide. In a 
dialogical self-system these social representations of suicide are personified by collective 
identity positions. Whenever an experiential moment activates the self-system dynamics, these 
sociocultural positions take their place in the intrapersonal dialogues constraining the 
individual’s thoughts, feelings and actions. In this sense, we suggest a semiotic-dialogical and 
sociocultural model of suicide, grounded on the dialogical self theory and the social 
representation theory. 
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In modern Western thinking, identity is conceived as an autonomous entity (i.e., 
stable centre of experience), independent (i.e., distinguished from Others) and 
endogenous (i.e., internal to the person) (Gonçalves, 1995, 2003). This perspective 
emphasizes the “exclusive separation” (vs. inclusive, see Valsiner, 1998, 2007) between 
the identity and the social surroundings, assuming a person’s independence, self-
determination, as well as the privacy of mental phenomena. Such exclusive separation 
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means that either the environment is believed to unilaterally influences the individual or 
the individual is believed to unilaterally influence the environment.  
Studying the individual person within this paradigm implies its isolation from 
relational context and its definition through its stable, unique and definite characteristics 
(Quartilho, 2006). Problems of the psyche are understood as pre-existing and therefore 
the aim of the research is usually to identify and categorize the discovered problems 
into a set of fixed categories or locate them in a coordinate system of stable dimensions 
(Walton, 2010). Following this line of thought, research on suicide has been dedicated, 
mostly, to the exploration of causality between a discrete entity (located in the suicidal 
person) and its behaviour. It has tried to identify demographic variables (e.g., gender, 
age, education level, religion) and clinical variables (e.g., depression, anxiety, abuse of 
substances, traumatic events) common to individuals at risk for suicide to predict their 
behaviour (Everall, 2000). This analysis assumes a reversible conception of time and 
focuses on inter-individual differences, looking to suicidal behaviour as a linear 
manifestation of a demographic or psychological variable (or the interaction of these 
factors), but disconnected from their immediate contexts. Despite the relevance of 
identifying these factors or generalized patterns, a considerable and diverse group of 
authors has been alerting to the need to study and investigate the suicide in alternative 
ways to the dominant biomedical model (Fitzpatrick, 2011; Hjelmeland & Knizek, 
2010; Sarchiapone & D’Aulerio, 2015; White, 2012). The paradox between a long 
tradition in suicide research and the increasing incidence of this phenomenon seems to 
appeal to the development of different perspectives to understand and study suicidal 
behaviour (Arthi, 2008).  
The postmodern movement has changed the way human phenomena are 
conceptualized and studied generating alternative conceptual frameworks. Its influence 
in psychology resulted in the development of new paradigms of which we highlight the 
social constructionism and the narrative perspective. Social constructionism posits that 
the understanding of psychological phenomena is not contained in the minds of 
individuals, but rather in the social processes, that is, in the relationships established 
between people through discursive practices (the focus shifted from the individual to the 
relationship). In this sense, the psychological processes can only be understood if they 
are contextualized and analysed in the light of the context and the relationships that the 
person is part of (historical and cultural positioning). There is no external and unique 
reality, pre-existent to the individual; instead the subjects themselves negotiate and 
actively co-construct the realities (i.e., meanings) to which they respond (relational 
construction of meaning). Central to this approach is then the process of assigning 
meaning to the experience. More than portray the “reality,” assign meaning is a 
relational construction in which, through language, experience becomes intelligible to 
oneself and Others. The language is not restricted to a communication vehicle of a pre-
linguistic reality, rather is seen as constitutive of human experience (i.e., the words do 
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things), as a joint action through which people create and experience the meaning of 
their social and psychological realities (Botella, 2001; Brockmeier & Harré, 2001; 
Gergen, 2000, 2009).  
According to the narrative perspective, rather than a fixed and unchanging entity 
to be discovered, each person is like a story that is being told. It is through the narrative, 
as a product of storytelling about us and the Others and for us and for Others, that we 
construct and make sense of our experience(s) and ourselves—the identity as a narrative 
phenomenon (Brockmeier & Harré, 2001; Bruner, 1986, 1987, 1991; Polkinghorne, 
1988; Sandelowski, 1991). This self-narrative is understood as a highly interactive 
phenomenon and as a dialogical co-construction between narrators and listeners 
(Hermans, 1996; Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995). This reading emphasizes the 
active role of the individual in the construction of meaning for his or her personal 
existence, within a conversational relationship with Others. In this sense, several 
authors (e.g., Botella, 2001; Hermans, 2003; Ho, Chan, Peng, & Ng, 2001; Josephs & 
Valsiner, 1998; Salgado & Gonçalves, 2007; Valsiner, 2004) argue that the minimum 
unit of psychological conceptualization is not the person as an isolated entity but the 
person-in-relationship. 
In line with this, the concept of social representation, positioned at the interface 
between the psychological and the social, is of particular instrumental value. The study 
of social representations allows us to access the appropriation of external reality by the 
subject and simultaneously the process of psychological elaboration of social reality. 
The social representation of suicide, as a representation of the phenomenon (object) and 
of someone (subject), is a process of symbolization, interpretation and construction of 
meanings. These meanings result from an activity that turns the representation in a 
construction and an expression of the subject (Jodelet, 1989).  
In this article, we integrate the dialogical self theory (DST) and the social 
representations theory (SRT) to suggest a semiotic-dialogical and sociocultural model 
of suicide, which assumes that human phenomena, such as suicide, consist of an active 
and intense relational co-construction of meanings (Gergen, 2000, 2009). The emphasis 
on interdependence (not to be confused with fusion) of the individual and social 
dimensions of subjective life, and on the central role of the person towards its ongoing 
(re)construction is, in our opinion, the greatest potential of this approach.  
Research in suicidology has been somehow “entrapped” by theoretical and 
methodological constraints, leading to the neglect of the subjective and intersubjective 
elements of the human experience (Bell, Stanley, Mallon, & Manthorpe, 2015). Several 
authors argue for the need to change the way of studying or “making suicide” and 
recognize this change as a shift from explanation to understanding the phenomenon 
(Hjelmeland & Knizek, 2010; Lester, 2013). We will use the phenomena of suicide for 
the purposes of integrating DST and SRT. 
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Dialogical Self: Self as Multiple, Social and Contextual 
DST conceives identity as a highly dynamic multiplicity of identity positions (I-
positions), each representing a perspective or a voice on the current experience. 
Therefore, various narratives can emerge from different voices about the same 
experiential phenomenon. In this context, the notion of voice goes beyond the 
expression of a particular point of view on certain personal experiences (i.e., content) 
but also reflects, in every moment, the positioning of the person towards an audience. 
These different I-positions negotiate meanings (through dialogue) to make sense of the 
experiential flow, in an always unfinished process marked by novelty and need for 
change. 
According to Hermans (2001a, 2001b, 2003), the dialogical self (DS), as a 
repertoire of multiple positions, comprises internal positions (i.e., those that are 
perceived as parts of the person, usually introduced by the personal pronoun ‘‘I’’) and 
external (i.e., those that are felt to be aspects of environment, but that the person 
identifies as belonging to him or herself, usually preceded by the possessive pronoun 
“Mine,” “My”). The subjective meaning of internal and external I-positions emerges 
from mutual reference; it is created in the dynamic interactions they establish over time 
with one another through dialogue. Thus, external I-positions consist of environmental 
aspects that are relevant to the individual from the perspective of one or more internal 
positions (e.g., “my son,” “my client”); likewise, the internal positions acquire their 
meaning through their relationship with one or more external position (e.g., ‘‘I as a 
mother,’’ ‘‘I as a psychiatrist,’’ respectively). Not only significant Others take place in 
the identity, but also the social groups to which the individual belongs (e.g., 
professional, political, religious, age, nationality, gender). Hermans and Kempen (1993) 
postulate that social communities have their own voice (i.e., a collective voice) that is 
able to tell stories that reflect the perspective of the community members on a wide 
variety of subjects from everyday life.  
The human ways of being—living as divided between different contexts 
(sociocultural and temporal) and multiplied by the plurality of experiences in each 
context inevitably leads to the question: how are individuals able to orchestrate their 
“crowd” of voices to generate in every moment new and functional meanings, 
maintaining a sense of personal continuity? As an alternative to individualistic and 
static tradition, in which human psychological functions are understood as “given” or 
predetermined, in a dialogical perspective these functions refer to dynamic self-
organized and self-innovative processes (Valsiner, 2002). These dynamic properties of 
psychological processes allow the person to make sense of the phenomenological 
variety (sensory, perceptual, emotional and cognitive) of his or her “here and now” 
experience and simultaneously enable the person to adapt to changes in life situation (in 
terms of time and space), while maintaining a sense of personal consistency. Valsiner 
(2002, 2004) even claims that the structural flexibility of the DS (i.e., the permanent 
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construction and reconstruction of relations between different I-positions) is its central 
quality, more than its multivocal and polyphonic character.  
 Identity is designed as a process of interaction between several voices, each one 
defending a particular point of view, but having the ability to change or develop when 
considering another voice(s)’ perspective(s) (Hermans, 1996; 2001b; Hermans & 
Kempen, 1993). The construction of meaning about a life event is thus a negotiated 
narration process, a negotiation that takes place between the various perspectives 
presented as relevant to the phenomenon—in a narrate, appropriate and (re)narrate cycle 
(or positioning, counter-positioning and repositioning). In this sense, meanings are not 
preexisting, but emerge from a dynamic field of forces and counter-forces (e.g., 
tensions, oppositions, conflicts, integrations, creations) generated by—and acted on —
dialogues between I-positions. These dynamics allow maintaining and updating the 
sense of personal identity (Hermans & Kempen, 1993; Valsiner, 2002).  
The DS operates not only through the construction of dialogical relations 
between different I-positions, but also through the continuous organization (i.e., 
construction and reconstruction) of the structure of the I-position repertoire (Hermans & 
Kempen, 1993; Valsiner, 2002, 2004). The dialogical exchanges between different I-
positions (and the consequent emergence of meaning) are made possible by the self-
organization of these positions in a power structure, in which some positions have a 
temporary most influential status over the Others. The domain (or power), as intrinsic 
characteristic of the dialogue (i.e., when a voice, or a coalition of voices, talk, the other 
voices are temporarily silenced), works as an organizer of the plurality of meanings 
generated about the same experience. The prevalence of a meaning necessarily implies 
the neglect (although temporary) of alternative ones. To remain functional, this 
hierarchical system must be highly dynamic, and permanently subject and available for 
updates: dominant positions in a given time can easily migrate to a secondary role, and 
positions previously no significant can assume a more central and leadership role 
(Hermans, 1996).  
Valsiner (2004, 2007) complements this approach by theorizing that the I-
positions that prevail over the Others personify perspectives or voices that communicate 
meta-meanings or promoter signs (i.e., meanings with a high level of generalization). 
This means that the temporary domain of these I-positions’ voice is associated with the 
fact that the meanings they construct when they dialogue with other I-positions —that 
we designate as argument, are the most relevant to the current experience. Also, 
according to Valsiner (2004, 2007), the process of synthesis and hierarchy of meanings 
(mediated by signs and guided by meta-meanings) regulates the flow of the vertical 
structure of I-positions (i.e., the positioning and repositioning) and provides integrity to 
identity. Therefore, the structural flexibility of this plurality of I-positions is regulated 
by the existence of dominance dialogical relations, based on the confrontation between 
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more or less relevant arguments, communicated by the positions, in relation to the 
current moment.  
Collective voices take part in these dialogues and catalyse the construction of 
meaning in the deepest levels of self-narratives. These voices do not replace the 
creativity of the speaker (i.e., motivations, values, interests and individual points of 
view), but shape the words and the discourses produced by colouring the subjectively 
elaborated meanings, dialogically committing them with past, present and future 
audiences. At every moment, the set of possible identity positions (i.e., the polyphony) 
depends on the linguistic resources available in the sociocultural world in which the 
individual is located. It is the diversity of discourses, norms and practices offered by the 
different cultural voices—a heteroglossic world in Bakhtin’s terminology (1981)—that 
allows the appropriation of different perspectives. As the individual is guided by 
culturally available meanings (e.g., transmitted by collective voices), sometimes his or 
her personal speech may resemble the more familiar or socially dominant voices. 
However, the mere reproduction of these meanings is highly unlikely, precisely because 
of the heteroglossia manifested in various social languages.  
According to Hermans (2001b; Hermans & Kempen, 1993), these voices or 
collective I-positions form coalitions with personal voices colouring the meanings 
constructed in their relations. Therefore, even the said personal meanings are not built 
in the absence of social, historical and cultural constraints; on the contrary, these 
personal meanings are not only influenced, but may even be invalidated and suppressed 
by the collective voices that represent the social groups to which the individual belongs. 
Still, we (re)emphasize that the influence of collective voices in identity should not be 
understood as deterministic. The meanings are actively constructed and reconstructed 
by the author or actor of the narrative from a particular position (e.g., opposition, 
challenge, agreement, disagreement with the dominant collective perspective). From 
this position he or she enters into dialogue, and addresses or responds to the Others and 
the world (Skinner, Valsiner, & Holland, 2001).  
Social Representations: Shared Semiotic Processes 
According to SRT, we can only truly understand the way people think and act 
about a segment of reality (e.g., object, phenomenon, experience) if we take into 
account the dynamic relationship between the individual cognition and the knowledge 
shared by social groups of belonging (e.g., beliefs, values, ideas, practices). Unlike 
more traditional models in psychology, based on individualistic methodologies and in 
an epistemology that functionally separates the subject from the object, in this approach 
“there is no break between the outer world and the inner world of the individual, the 
subject and object are not essentially different” (Moscovici, 1969, p. 9).  
A social representation is, by definition, “a form of knowledge, socially 
elaborated and shared, with a practical objective, that contributes to the construction of 
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a common reality for a social group” (Jodelet, 1989, p. 36). The representation is 
socially constructed and shared, through interactions and communication phenomena 
within a social group, justifying its social character. Its practical nature results from its 
role in regulating interactions, communication and social behaviour, thus taking a status 
of practical and social theory (Jodelet, 1989). SRT focuses on the analysis of the 
construction and transformation of social knowledge (Jovchelovitch, 1998; Marková, 
2000). Social representations are: a) relational and dynamic organizations of knowledge 
and language shared by a group of individuals (Marková, 2000); b) dynamic sets that 
aim to guide behaviours and social interactions; c) both product and process: as product, 
they are the content (structure) that circulates as the real version, impregnating the 
speeches, images, opinions and attitudes; as process, they refer to the psychological and 
social mechanisms that underlie the formation, organization and processing of such 
content and their social functions and effectiveness.  
Social representations can be found in the cognitive and symbolic activity of a 
group. They do not represent accurate copies of objects, but emerge from a process 
through which the individual not only reconstructs, but also creates and innovates 
shared knowledge, presenting the same reality in a new way (social, cultural and 
historically). The two processes that are at the origin of social representations—
anchoring and objectification—highlight the interdependence between psychological 
activity and social conditions. In objectification, concepts are associated with images, 
making concrete previously abstract notions. Objectification is the process by which a 
representation crystallizes: abstract notions are converted into images whose inner 
content forms a figurative nucleus (through decontextualization) that transforms the 
images into elements of reality seen as natural (Moscovici, 2000). Anchoring is the 
process by which what is strange is turned into something familiar, that is, the unknown 
is anchored on existing representations. Thus, the new object of representation acquires 
sense, becomes known; what is new becomes an integral part. This representation, in 
turn, becomes part of the integrational system of the individual in the social world, 
because what is common to a group allows its members to share communication and 
influence the action (Moscovici, 2000). Objectification and anchoring are two deeply 
intertwined processes, concomitantly developed to give meaning to social 
representations.  
Social representations perform two basic functions: a normative function of 
cognitive integration of novelty and interpretation of reality and a prescriptive function 
of guidance of the behaviour and social relationships (Moscovici, 2000). On the one 
hand, social representations transform what is strange in familiar, by adding novelty to 
existing knowledge structures endowed with some stability. This way, events of social 
life are classified in a grid or template of common interpretation, allowing members of a 
group to act in accordance. This means that social representations constitute a 
consensual reality for the members of a group. On the other hand, they rule and guide 
ROSA & TAVARES 
92 
the way people interact with the world and with Others, organizing the behaviour and 
the communication exchanges (Jodelet, 1989). It can be said that the social 
representations help individuals to orient themselves in their material and social 
universe, justifying their behaviour in relation to social norms as well as their 
integration into the social context (Abric, 1994; Vala, 1997).  
According to Valsiner’s (2003) semiotic-cultural perspective on social 
representations, they belong to the category of pre-adaptive means; they are semiotic 
mediating tools that guide the construction of meaning about everyday life events. This 
means that social representations are meaning complexes (macro-level) that function as 
cultural constraints of human conduct in its present—future temporal path. These 
macro-level meanings, or promoter signs, generate micro-level constraints that guide 
the thoughts, feelings and action processes of individuals (Tavares, Salgado, & 
Gonçalves, 2006; Valsiner, 2003). As they exist both in the communication system of 
the society and in the individual minds (as I-positions), they constitute themselves a link 
between the social and personal worlds (Valsiner, 2001, 2007). If we consider that 
suicide is intensely personal yet socioculturally situated, this emphasis on the 
confluence of individual and social elements conveyed by SRT makes it adequate for 
guiding the investigation of the cultural meanings of suicide (Arthi, 2008). Furthermore, 
such a reading of suicide, as a border phenomenon between the subject and the 
sociocultural and historical context, between the subjective and intersubjective, appeals 
to a dialogical perspective: the construction of meaning for suicide happens through the 
dialogues between I-positions located in the internal and external domains of the self-
system. 
A Semiotic-Dialogial and Sociocultural Model of Suicide 
Identity is seen as historically and culturally constructed, which is not a property 
of individuals, but rather is constructed in discourse, shaped by a range of social, 
cultural and historical forces (Prokopiou, Cline, & Abreu, 2012, p. 496). 
The self-organization of the self-system is based on a hierarchical operating 
system. In every experiential moment, a position (or a set of positions) occupies the 
“stage of the self-system” and brings arguments of relevance to the operational centre, 
which are gradually organized in arguments of higher abstraction order. These macro-
level arguments, promoter signs in Valsiner’s (2004), have properties of self-evaluation 
and self-regulation that ensure the stability of the current self-system structure until a 
new one is required. This organization is not the result of a commanding voice from a 
static and permanent higher order structure; it is a property that emerges from the 
combined dialogue between different I-positions. The functional character of this self-
organizing capacity is tested in moments that require a restructuring of the identity 
system and it is influenced by personal and contextual variables. 
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Assuming that human experiences have a dynamic and multifaceted nature, 
suicide can be thought of as a dialogical process of social and semiotic negotiation 
resulting from the continuous dialogues within the individual and between individuals. 
The understanding of what drives a person to assume an identity position, in this case 
‘‘I as suicidal,’’ will have to be explored in these dialogues. To become ‘‘I as suicidal’’ 
is what happens to us, or what we are, when this personal dimension takes the stage of 
dynamic interactions with the Others. This position emerges as a way of “making 
yourself” according to a particular constellation of positions at a given time in a 
personal space. It is a personal reality created under the influence of social 
prescriptions, based on a network of intrapersonal, interpersonal and intergroup 
relations. If we analyse suicide from this self-organization perspective, this behaviour 
emerges as an intentional and conscious act (contrary to neutral role that has been 
linked to the individual) that requires a previous work of projective imagination and 
narrative ownership (Hustvedt, 2013; Kaiser & Renberg, 2012). This work is based on 
the dialogues (relational dynamics) and arguments (personal, social, and cultural 
content) around the ‘‘I as suicidal.’’ We will now detail a proposal about the path that 
can lead the ‘‘I as suicidal’’ to a commanding voice of the self-system (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Schematic Summary of the Semiotic-Dialogical and Sociocultural Model of 
Suicide 
 
 
Triggering event and questioning the current self-system structure 
Uncertainty and the need for restructuring 
Self-organizatio  in action—dialogues 
Self-system restructuring around I-as-SUICIDAL 
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We suggest that when a subject fails to make sense of an event, resorting to the 
set of meanings constructed by its present self-system, this event will challenge this 
systems’ structure. The rupture in the temporary stability of the self-system will demand 
the construction of a new organization. To do so, the different I-positions enter dialogue 
and end up being reorganized around the ‘‘I as Suicidal’’. 
Triggering Event and Questioning the Current Self-System Structure 
A stressful situation, an unexpected or too demanding event with negative 
character that challenges our perceptions and expectations about ourselves, Others or 
the world, can become a triggering event (Rogers, Bromley, McNally, & Lester, 2007). 
Momentarily, this experience threatens the organization so far achieved, questioning the 
degree of adaptation of the existing identity structure. For example, let us think in a 
situation of unemployment as triggering event. In contemporary society, the position ‘‘I 
as professional’’ occupies a prominent place in the self-system (elaborated in Rosa, 
2009). In this sense, a situation of unemployment will activate arguments around the 
loss of standards, security and stability and positions like ‘‘I as incompetent,’’ ‘‘I as 
marginalized’’ and ‘‘I as excluded’’ can emerge. Therefore, a previously central and 
functional I-position loses its main arguments and other arguments that emerge can 
push this position out of the central zone and lead it to a secondary role or a state of 
“hibernation” (Prokopiou, Cline, & Abreu, 2012). 
This concept of hibernation reinforces the idea mentioned above that the 
positions that are not active (in a given time in the construction of self-meaning) do not 
disappear. They just leave the stage or the centre of the self-system and will now be 
“behind the curtains,” but always remain available. In the example of unemployment, 
when the ‘‘I as professional’’ (a previously central I-position) undergoes a negative 
change, it becomes a hibernated I-position as a coordinated strategy to protect the 
system as a whole. Interestingly, when this hibernated I-position returns to the active 
centre, it is able to have a reused utility (Prokopiou, Cline, & Abreu, 2012).  
Uncertainty and the Need for Restructuring 
This threat to the previous identity structure and its organizational capacity will 
increase the levels of uncertainty and ambivalence, leaving the system vulnerable to 
surrounding information. Uncertainty is not in itself a negative experience. In fact, it is 
the permanent alternation between different levels of uncertainty (absence to maximum) 
that enables and feeds the meaning-making process (O’Sullivan-Lago & Abreu, 2010). 
However, when unresolved and sustained, it generates anxiety and insecurity (Hermans, 
2007), because “the human being does not tolerate the uncertainty towards the future 
and searches for stability” (Rosa, Duarte, & Gonçalves, 2008, p. 166). In order to 
survive, the self-system has to risk leaving the actual unstable structure and look for a 
more viable and adaptive solution. To resolve uncertainty, to restore a functional 
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organization and to find a new structure that guarantees identity continuity, the system 
activates the dialogues between I-positions (Abbey, 2002; Hermans, 2001). 
Self-Organization in Action—Dialogues 
The meanings constructed in every experience of the individual are part of the 
DS in the form of arguments voiced by different I-positions. Throughout life we are 
exposed to different meanings related to suicide, which become part of the field of 
argumentative possibilities for I-positions to use. Each and all the meanings that we face 
have the potential to be aggregated in an identity dimension (in this case, ‘‘I as 
suicidal’’) (Gergen & Gergen, 1988). In different social and cultural contexts, and even 
at different times in history, these meanings can be more frequent, more dominant in the 
shared meanings’ repertoire. According to Marbe’s law there is a “direct relation 
between the frequency of an associative response and the speed of its utterance” (Dany, 
Urdapilleta, & Lo Monaco, 2014, p. 5), so the words that appear at first in our mind are 
more cognitively available. Therefore, a particular experience (i.e., a triggering event) 
can generate (in some people more than Others) suicidal thoughts, or in other words, 
can put in the “self-system’s stage” I-positions that come into dialogue with the ‘‘I as 
suicidal.’’ In these dialogic and semiotic dynamics of self-organization, sociocultural I-
positions, which personify social representations, play a central role.  
Next, we will reinterpret a range of factors that have been identified as 
protective or as risk in relation to suicidal behaviour. According to the model presented 
here, these factors will be analysed in the dialogues (and arguments) between the ‘‘I as 
suicidal’’ and sociocultural I-positions, such as ‘‘I as religious’’ and ‘‘My Religion,’’ ‘‘I 
as member’’ of a community and ‘‘My community’’ (friends, neighbours), ‘‘I as 
cultural’’ and ‘‘My Culture’’ (dominant or minority) and the values of My Culture. It is 
important to note that the complexity and contextual dependence of these I-positions 
make it possible that the same position (in a different context) may convey arguments to 
try to silence (protective), or give voice (risk) to, the position ‘‘I as suicidal.’’ We 
decided to divide these arguments into two types, which overlap with two dimensions 
highlighted by other authors: type 1 - regulation (Durkheim, 1897) or social practice 
(Abric, 2001; Moliner, 2001) and type 2 - integration (Durkheim, 1897)1 or social 
influence (Galand & Salès-Wuillemin, 2009). The first relates to the content, standards 
and societal habits that shape a person’s relationship (through the desires and emotions) 
with the object of representation, in this case with suicide. The second refers to the 
relationship, since the self-referential meanings are constructed in interaction with 
Others, to which we are linked through social networks. Both positions that oppose or 
support the ‘‘I as suicidal’’ may employ arguments of type 1 and/or type 2 (Figure 2).  
                                       
1 Regulation is associated with an external constraining of the person by the societal norms; it has to do 
with obligations and responsibilities. Integration is related to the support or the feeling of support that a 
person receives from its social groups; it has to do with feelings of comfort and affiliation. 
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Figure 2. Types of Arguments Used by the Collective I-Positions 
 
We will start with examples of type 1 arguments seeking to silence the ‘‘I as 
suicidal’’ (protective factors). In a person with an active religious involvement, the 
positions ‘‘I as religious’’ and ‘‘My Religion’’ will surely enter into a dialogue with the 
‘‘I as suicidal.’’ In Christian doctrine (we are considering the Catholic religion for its 
emphasis in the Portuguese culture), human life is a central topic and suicide represents 
a violation of that principle. Therefore, these positions will use the argument of 
commitment towards certain central religious beliefs, which consist of meanings like 
“do not kill,” “only God has the power to give and take life,” “suicide is prohibited, it is 
a sin” (Dervic et al., 2004; Goldston et al., 2008; Nelson, Hanna, Houri, & Klimes-
Dougan, 2012). Another group of positions that can verbalize such arguments are ‘‘I as 
cultural’’ and the values of My Culture. For example, in some cultures, these positions 
can activate the argument of the “shame” value, which consists of a sense of failure and 
disappointment in the face of expectations of Self and Others (individuals or 
society/culture as a whole). This argument may involve meanings as “the shame caused 
to the family, shame for being a coward or shame for having given up” (Goldston et al., 
2008; Sarchiapone & D’Aulerio, 2015).  
Also in relation to arguments that seek to silence the ‘‘I as suicidal,’’ we will 
now analyse type 2. The positions ‘‘I as religious’’ and ‘‘My Religion’’ may use the 
argument of the benefits for being an active element of the formal activities or religious 
rituals—broader social networks, more favourable perceptions of the quality of their 
support networks and a greater sense of belonging (Dervic et al., 2004; Goldston et al., 
I-positions that 
attempt to silence  
‘‘I as suicidal’’ 
I-positions that 
attempt to give 
voice to  
‘‘I as suicidal’’ 
Type 2 arguments: 
integration or social 
influence 
Type 1 arguments:  
regulation or social 
practice 
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2008; Koenig, George, & Titus, 2004; Moxey, McEvoy, Bowe, & Attia, 2011; Nelson, 
Hanna, Houri, & Klimes-Dougan, 2012; Pescosolido & Georgianna, 1989; Robins & 
Fiske, 2009; Stack & Lester, 1991). Along the same lines, the positions ‘‘I as member’’ 
of a community and ‘‘My community’’ may bring to arguments like “you are part of 
who we are,” “without you the group will not be complete,” “you’re not alone,” seeking 
to satisfy the basic need for belonging and social support (Durkheim, 1951; Heikkinen, 
Aro, & Lonnqvist, 1993; Joiner, 2005; Lester, 2001; Maimon & Kuhl, 2008; Trout, 
1980; Van Orden et al., 2010). The same argument can be used by the ‘‘I as cultural’’ 
and the values of ‘‘My Culture’’ through, for example, the value of “collectivism” 
(Goldston et al., 2008; Sarchiapone & D’Aulerio, 2015). 
We will now focus on the opposite pole, which includes the arguments used by 
other positions to give voice to the ‘‘I as suicidal’’ (risk factors), primarily through 
type 1 arguments. In certain cultural contexts, the ‘‘I as cultural’’ and ‘‘My Minority 
Culture’’ present powerful symbolic meanings such as “make your voice heard; 
manifest yourself; fight for the rights of disadvantaged,” which legitimize and promote 
the voice of the ‘‘I as suicidal’’ (Counts, 1988). We cannot ignore that we now live in a 
time of suicide bombers, murder-suicide, self-immolation. A break of continuity in 
culture, as a common element in the experience of suicide, might also validate the script 
of ‘‘I as suicidal’’ as a dominant voice (Lakeman & Fitzgerald, 2008). The experience 
of emigration (acculturation) or belonging to a micro-culture of the country of origin 
(enculturation), represents the challenge of building a functional balance between the 
assimilation of the dominant culture and the retention of cultural specificity (Goldston 
et al., 2008). In this situation, the ‘‘I as cultural’’ and ‘‘My dominant culture’’ or ‘‘My 
minority culture’’ verbalize arguments that evidence its vagueness such as “I no longer 
know who I am,” “I need to redefine myself,” “I have to make sense.” In this sense, 
another position can assume the centrality of the system and the ‘‘I as suicidal’’ 
emerges as an option as valid as any other (Ball & Chandler, 1989; Chandler & 
Lalonde, 1998, 2008; Chandler, Lalonde, Sokol, & Hallett, 2003). 
Finally, we refer to the arguments of type 2 that give voice to the ‘‘I as 
suicidal.’’ Social groups (‘‘I as a member’’ of a community and ‘‘My community’’) and 
cultural groups (‘‘I as cultural’’ and ‘‘My culture’’) may, contrary to what was 
previously described, exert a regressive and oppressive function (Quartilho, 2006). The 
argument around the value “collectivism” can arouse to the awareness of racial 
oppression and discrimination, meaning non-integration (Goldston et al., 2008; 
Sarchiapone & D’Aulerio, 2015). On the other hand, when belonging to a group 
requires levels too high of commitment and loyalty, the person becomes unable to make 
decisions in crisis situations (positions refuse to dialogue) and merely follows 
predefined options (Quartilho, 2006). 
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Self-System Restructuring Around ‘‘I as suicidal’’ 
We argue that, as a result of these identity meetings, a new structure is 
developed around the ‘‘I as suicidal,’’ which now occupies a central role in the self-
system. Suicide becomes a viable option, or ‘‘I as suicidal,’’ has voice and power, when 
the identity system is exposed to a triggering event that questions the adaptive nature of 
the current structure and thus activates self-organization strategies (Lester, 2013). The 
new structure enables to restore the narrative coherence and the temporal direction, that 
is, the continuity of identity (Fitzpatrick, 2011). Therefore, “the suicide [it is 
constructed as] a form […] of taking charge of his narrative and ending it” (Hustvedt, 
2003). 
Conclusion 
The socioconstructionist perspective that promotes a holistic view of human 
experience and existence is directed to the search for interactions and meaning. It is 
important to note that this view does not reject the analysis of individual characteristics, 
but argues that they should be read in terms of their personal and social meaning. 
Accordingly, suicide does not seem reducible to the effect of certain attributes. Personal 
attributes and behaviour are permeated with meanings not decipherable from its mere 
measurement (e.g., effect size, proportion of variance). It is by understanding these 
meanings that human experience can be understood. 
Suicide is now widely recognized as a phenomenon multi-determined by 
individual, psychological and sociocultural factors (e.g., Roy, 1985; Roy, Nielsen, 
Rylander & Sarchiapone, 2000). These factors have, however, deserved a distinct 
attention from the scientific community, with a greater emphasis on individual and 
psychological factors, either alone or taken in relation (Sarchiapone & D’Aulerio, 
2015). It seems to us particularly important that research on suicide contemplates the 
active role that the Self can play in the decision to die by suicide, considering the 
identity multiplicity and relating it to the sociocultural influences that shape it. We 
believe that the conceptual framework presented here allows for some conceptual 
movement between the individual and social levels of analysis of human behaviour by 
integrating subjective and intersubjective dimensions. The future direction of our 
research line is to develop studies to study how the meaning of suicide is constructed. 
We intend to explore the meaning-making processes in the story of those who have 
already appropriated of suicide (suicide attempts), analysing the meanings (attitudes, 
values) conveyed by different sociocultural agents. This will be the starting point for the 
development of prevention and intervention strategies that consider the cultural 
specificities. 
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